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Abstract 
We study how short-term changes in institutional owner attention affect managers’ short-term 
disclosure choices.  Holding institutional ownership constant and controlling for industry-quarter 
effects, we find that managers respond to attention by increasing the number of forecasts and 8-K 
filings.  Rather than alter the decision of whether to forecast or to provide more informative 
disclosures, attention causes minor disclosure adjustments.  Although attention explains significant 
variation in the quantity of disclosure, we find little change in abnormal volume and volatility, the 
bid-ask spread, or depth.  Overall, our evidence suggests that management responds to temporary 
institutional investor attention by making disclosures that have little effect on information quality 
or liquidity.  
Keywords: disclosure, management forecasts, 8-K filings, information quality, liquidity, 
institutional ownership, passive investors, corporate governance, monitoring 
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Much research on voluntary disclosure focuses on decisions stemming from persistent 
factors.  For example, the economic forces that give rise to a firm’s level of proprietary costs are 
largely persistent, and how the voluntary disclosure decision is affected by proprietary costs is 
persistent.  Institutional investor ownership (IO) is another relatively stable determinant of 
disclosure.  Prior research indicates that increases in disclosure associated with increases in IO can 
decrease information asymmetry and improve liquidity.  In this paper, we hold IO constant, and 
examine how short-term changes in IO attention affect the firm’s short-term disclosure choices, 
and the resulting information quality and liquidity consequences. 
To motivate our analysis, we begin by documenting significant short-term changes in 
disclosure.  Between 2001 and 2016, the typical firm switched the number of forecasts, 8-Ks, and 
total disclosures provided 8.9, 10.9, and 12.1 times, respectively. This pattern of small increases 
and decreases in disclosure is quite different from the large one-time changes associated with index 
reconstitutions studied in related work.  Then, to investigate whether fleeting investor attention 
helps explain transient disclosure behavior, we use the proxy for attention created by Kempf et al. 
(2017).  The intuition behind the Kempf et al. approach is that a firm’s IOs have other investments 
as well, and when return shocks affect those other investments, the IOs will pay less attention to 
the firm.1  In other words, the strength of IO attention paid to a given firm will vary depending on 
the returns on other positions in their investors’ portfolios.2   
                                                          
1 As evidence that their distraction measure is related to monitoring, Kempf et al. (2017) show that when a firm’s IOs 
are distracted, there is less participation in conference calls, fewer shareholder proposals, and less trading.  Further 
supporting this interpretation, Kempf et al. find that during distraction windows, managers undertake diversifying 
value-destroying acquisitions, cut dividends, and grant opportunistically-timed CEO options. 
2 This approach is akin to recent work exploiting shocks in one part of a bank’s portfolio to study how monitoring 
changes for the bank’s other clients (e.g., Gopalan et al. 2011, Murfin 2012). 
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This distraction measure assumes that investor attention paid to a firm declines when that 
firm’s investors have other portfolio firms that experience large positive or negative industry 
returns.  The measure classifies an industry as attention-grabbing when it experiences the highest 
or lowest returns of all industries that quarter, and then develops a firm-specific distraction 
measure by aggregating across the portfolios of all of its IOs.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of 
how the distraction measure is constructed.  In our illustration, we assume that a retail firm has 
only one investor, and that the investor equally weights that retail firm and an energy firm in its 
portfolio.  Thus, the distraction measure for the retail firm would equal 0.50 if the energy industry 
has the highest or lowest return that quarter, and zero otherwise.  The appeal of this measure is that 
distraction events arising in other industries are, by construction, exogenous to the firm, and that 
firms within the same industry are differentially exposed due to variation in their investor base.  
The Kempf et al. measure is continuous: low values indicate low distraction, and high values 
indicate high distraction. Equivalently, low values indicate high attention, and high values indicate 
low attention. Thus, attention is the negative of distraction.  We therefore refer to attention and 
distraction interchangeably throughout the paper.   
We find that disclosure has a negative relation with IO distraction.  Because variation in 
distraction comes from developments in other industries, and because we control for industry-
quarter and firm-calendar quarter effects, it is unlikely that our results reflect shocks in the firm’s 
own industry (e.g., economic conditions or an M&A wave), or firm-specific disclosure habits 
(always forecasting in the first quarter).  The effects of IO attention on disclosure are economically 
significant.  The coefficient estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in IO 
distraction decreases the number of disclosures by 6.4%.  We find that distraction explains similar 
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declines in the number of forecasts and 8-Ks, but not the propensity to forecast, consistent with 
managers responding to IO attention with relatively minor changes in disclosure.3   
To ensure that the variation in disclosure we find does not relate to shocks to firm 
fundamentals or to changes in the IO base, we repeat our tests after eliminating firm-quarters with 
large changes in earnings and institutional ownership.  Our results remain.  Because Kempf et al. 
(2017) find that managers engage in value-destroying behavior (i.e., choices that are against 
shareholder interests) when their investors are distracted, we then examine whether managers 
could be adjusting their disclosure to obscure this behavior.  Our finding that IO attention increases 
disclosure survives when we omit firms that are undertaking M&A transactions outside their 
industry, cutting their dividends, or profiting from insider trading.  Of course, management may 
take other types of actions that harm shareholders, and reduce disclosure to conceal these actions.  
However, we continue to find the same results when we eliminate firms with poor future stock 
returns, where one would expect the effect of these value-destroying choices to be evident.  This 
suggests that our finding of less disclosure when there is distraction is not primarily coming from 
management attempting to conceal bad behavior or bad news. 
Next, we study the consequences of attention-driven changes in disclosure, including 
forecast features, market responses to disclosures, and liquidity.  We find that managers respond 
to attention with changes that appear cosmetic. Specifically, managers increase forecasts of 
secondary instead of core items, and do not add new forecasts outside the earnings announcement 
period.  We also find that IO distraction has no effect on forecast horizon.  And, despite our earlier 
                                                          
3 Our findings complement recent survey evidence on investor relations officers’ communications with IOs (Brown, 
Call, Clement, and Sharp 2019).  They find that private phone calls between the firm’s investor relations team and 
IOs, forecasts, and 8-Ks are among the most important means for firms to communicate with IOs.  For example, one 
officer reports that “I'll initiate calls or calls will come into me, and that happens on a daily basis” (p. 64).  Thus, we 
expect IOs to express their preference for more disclosure during private phone calls with management.  
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evidence of significant decreases in disclosure quantity, abnormal volume and volatility are no 
different during periods of IO distraction.   
We then examine how IO attention affects liquidity.  Because the literature typically finds 
a negative relation between liquidity and information asymmetry (Balakrishnan et al. 2014; 
Schoenfeld 2017), one prediction motivated by our lack of findings on information quality is that 
liquidity does not change.  Consistent with this, we find little relation between IO attention and the 
bid-ask spread or depth on disclosure days or over the entire quarter.  This evidence supports the 
idea that management responds to temporary IO attention by making disclosures that have little 
effect on information quality or liquidity.  Our large panel of firm-quarters and plausibly 
exogenous variation in IO attention reduce the possibility that our non-results stem from power or 
endogeneity problems.  
The combined results raise the question of why IOs ask for more disclosure, when 
management responds with disclosures that appear cosmetic.  To understand this, consider both 
the nature of disclosure changes and the types of IO attention driving these changes.  Recall that 
the disclosure changes we document are fleeting and typically relate to secondary rather than core 
items.  Because these changes are not substantial on their own and do not represent a commitment 
to increased disclosure, they do not improve information quality or liquidity (Leuz and Verrecchia 
2000).  
In terms of the types of attention behind disclosure changes, we find that quarterly 
disclosure is most sensitive to the attention of passive IOs, the least informed IOs.  If every quarter, 
passive IOs did not express their preference for more disclosure, then the preferences of both 
management and non-passive IOs would be more highly weighted.  Management and non-passive 
IOs generally prefer less disclosure (e.g., Bushee and Noe 2000).  Therefore, one interpretation is 
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that, while passive IOs asking for more disclosure does not yield more quality disclosure this 
quarter, it yields more quality disclosure overall than if passive IOs did not voice their preferences.  
Firms have incentives to respond to attention and demand for disclosure by passive IOs, because 
passive IOs are active participants in all shareholder votes.  If firms subsequently reduce disclosure 
when IOs are distracted, we find that they are less likely to cut back net earnings and revenue 
forecasts and more likely to reduce secondary forecasts such as gross margin and capex forecasts, 
because attention will return in the short term.  
Our paper contributes to research concerned with understanding firm disclosure choices 
(Verrecchia 1990; Healy and Palepu 2001; Beyer et al. 2010), and forecasts and 8-Ks in particular 
(Lerman and Livnat 2010; Noh et al. 2017).  A common theme in this literature is that firms 
develop a sustained disclosure policy that incorporates their competitive environment, proprietary 
and agency costs, and investor base.  Consistent with this literature, we find that managers rarely 
adjust their decision to forecast.  However, we also find that the number of forecasts and 8-Ks 
provided regularly changes, and that this variation is predictably related to IO attention.4  One 
novel aspect of this finding is that managers reduce disclosure without worsening information 
quality or liquidity.  
We contribute to an emerging literature that seeks to provide causal evidence of a relation 
between IO and firm disclosure.  Boone and White (2015) and Bird and Karolyi (2016) advance 
this literature by studying index reconstitutions.  However, index reconstitutions are rare, affect a 
small subset of (similarly-sized) firms, and represent a different form of change in institutional 
ownership/attention than what we study.  In addition, the market capitalization that Russell uses 
                                                          
4 In this way, our paper also relates to work studying strategic disclosure timing in the context of overall market 
attention (e.g., Damodaran 1989; deHaan et al. 2015; Niessner 2015). 
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to assign index membership is not observable to researchers.  Various approaches have been 
developed to address this non-observability, but none of these approaches is perfect, and different 
approaches can lead to different inferences (Chen et al. 2018).  Identifying whether IO attention 
could alter disclosure policy has been challenging, because attention-grabbing events for the firm 
(e.g., capital raising, losses) can cause disclosure changes for their own reasons.  Our analysis 
builds on the insight that IOs have limited attention (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009), and that 
attention-grabbing events occurring in other industries can exogenously shift oversight away from 
the firm.   
Our paper is also relevant to the literature studying IO monitoring.  The shift of public firm 
ownership from active IOs to passive IOs has generated interest in how IOs influence management 
behavior, including disclosure.  Debate has followed about whether IO ownership improves or 
worsens monitoring of the firm.  One line of work (e.g., Boone and White 2015; Bird and Karolyi 
2016) finds that passive IOs are associated with more voluntary disclosure and higher disclosure 
quality, which leads to reductions in information asymmetry and improvements in liquidity.  
Others (e.g., Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017) caution that passive investors often employ uniform 
rules-based monitoring techniques that are not effective for more complicated situations, and in 
some cases impose unnecessary costs on management.  Consistent with disclosure being costly 
and passive IOs asking management for incremental disclosures, we find that managers increase 
disclosure when more passive IO attention is paid to them, but that these adjustments have little 
effect on information quality.   
2. Related literature and motivation 
A large literature examines voluntary disclosure (for surveys, see Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Beyer et al. 2010).  In general, shareholders prefer voluntary disclosure that maximizes the benefits 
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of disclosure (reduction in information asymmetry, as well as capital market benefits such as 
greater liquidity and lower cost of capital) net of its costs (proprietary costs and litigation risk).  
Firm managers can have different preferences for disclosure than outside shareholders (Beyer et 
al. 2010, p. 305).  Managers of companies that do not need external capital may desire less 
disclosure so they can extract private benefits, engage in insider trading, avoid revealing sensitive 
information to competitors, or simply because of the effort involved in disclosure.  Likewise, 
shareholders who have private information may prefer less disclosure, whereas shareholders who 
rely on public information prefer more disclosure. 
Corporate governance mechanisms such as IO monitoring can help enforce outside 
shareholders’ preferred choice of disclosure.  IOs can express their disclosure preference through 
regular interactions with management (Brown et al. 2019), their choice of holdings (Edmans and 
Manso 2010; Park et al. 2019), or shareholder votes on appointments (Appel, Gormley, and Kim 
2016).  IO demand for public disclosure can also be communicated through analysts, who 
participate in conference calls and interact with management (e.g., Jung, Wong, and Zhang 2015). 
Kempf et al. (2017) find that IO distraction causes value-destroying acquisitions, weak pay-for-
performance relations, and a greater likelihood of dividend cuts, which suggests a positive role for 
IO monitoring.  IOs, however, face constraints when monitoring.  Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) 
discuss how passive IOs must oversee a large number of portfolio firms at a low cost, which limits 
the effectiveness of their monitoring in certain governance matters.   
Theoretical and empirical research suggests that a commitment to greater disclosure 
improves firm liquidity (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).  Balakrishnan et al. (2014) provide causal 
evidence of this relation by exploiting exogenous analyst coverage terminations associated with 
brokerage firm closures between 2000 and 2008.  Recent research finds that large increases in 
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passive IO caused by index reconstitutions are associated with a sustained increase in voluntary 
disclosure (Boone and White 2015; Bird and Karolyi 2016; Schoenfeld 2017).  These increases in 
passive IO are also associated with increases in information quality as measured by abnormal 
return volatility and the length and content of 8-Ks, and increases in liquidity as measured by 
volume and bid-ask spreads.   
However, index reconstitutions occur rarely, affect only a small percentage of firms whose 
market value is around the cut-off, and cause large changes to institutional ownership.5  Whether 
more routine IO (or attention) changes have the same consequences for disclosure and information 
quality as in the above studies is unclear.  The fact that transitory increases in disclosure are not a 
commitment to increased disclosure suggest that they may not improve liquidity (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000).  Related, firms incur costs when disclosing and wish to limit these costs.  For 
example, firms invest in fixed accounting resources based on their needs, and demands for 
additional resources can cause errors (Gillette et al. 2017).  Chapman and Green (2017) argue that 
adjustment costs include information processing and collection costs, opportunity costs of adding 
disclosures within space limitations, and potential reputation and litigation costs arising from 
incorrect predictions of uncertain future outcomes.  Moreover, additional disclosures can increase 
proprietary and agency costs.  Finally, managers wish to limit voluntary disclosure to avoid setting 
a precedent for future disclosure (Graham et al. 2005). 
Managers may instead find ways of adjusting disclosure to respond to temporary attention 
without meaningfully improving either information quality or liquidity.  That is, while large 
permanent changes in ownership may require significant increases in disclosure and information 
                                                          
5 For example, Table 2 and Figure 4 of Boone and White report that firms affected by reconstitutions tend to have 
market capitalization ranging from $1.1 billion to $1.6 billion. 
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quality that improve liquidity, managers could respond to temporary demand by IOs with minor 
disclosure changes.  For example, managers may provide more forecasts than usual, but the 
forecasts contain little new information and are provided at times when the firm is already making 
other disclosures.   
3. Data and research design 
3.1 Data 
We construct our sample using the intersection of several datasets.  We begin by matching 
a firm-quarter panel of the Kempf et al. (2017) distraction measure to the Thomson Reuters 
institutional holdings database.  We then merge in management forecasts from I/B/E/S, 8-K filings 
from EDGAR, firm stock price, return and volume data from CRSP, bid-ask spread and depth data 
from DTAQ, and fundamental data from Compustat.  We match financial statement data from 
Compustat for the most recent fiscal quarter that ends prior to or at the same time as the calendar 
quarter (for example, for a firm with a January fiscal year-end, we match the April fiscal quarter 
to the June calendar quarter, the July fiscal quarter to the September calendar quarter, etc.).  
We analyze the post-Reg FD period starting in 2001 and ending in the first quarter of 2016.6  
We require non-missing data on our dependent variables and the control variables described below.  
These requirements result in a final dataset of 100,378 quarterly observations from 2001 the first 
quarter of 2016.  To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables by quarter 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
                                                          
6 We start our main sample in 2001 to avoid issues with respect to missing forecasts in the early years of the Thomson 
First Call guidance dataset (Chuk et al. 2013), and because Regulation Fair Disclosure was enacted in 2000, which 
changed forecast behavior.  Nevertheless, in Table 3, Panel B we repeat our tests on samples beginning in 1994 and 
1998 and find the same results.  
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3.2 Research design  
Our tests employ the following specification: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 × 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛼𝑗,𝑡 +γ × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a measure of quarterly disclosure activity by firm 𝑖 in quarter 
t, 𝛼𝑖,𝑞 and 𝛼𝑗,𝑡 are firm-calendar quarter and industry-quarter fixed effects, respectively, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are firm controls for voluntary disclosure choices. 
The dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡, is an indicator for providing a management forecast, or the 
number of forecasts, 8-K filings, and total disclosures at the firm-quarter level.  Forecast Firm (the 
indicator) and Forecasts (count) measure all types of forecasts (earnings, revenues, dividends, cash 
flow, etc.) that quarter, while 8-Ks measures the number of 8-Ks.  We measure all 8-Ks because 
the degree of management discretion differs across item types (Lerman and Livnat 2010; Gleason, 
Ling, and Zhao 2018), and we assume that any variation in total 8-Ks related to attention comes 
from voluntary instead of mandatory disclosures (similar to Bird and Karolyi 2016).7  When firms 
have multiple forecasts or 8-Ks on the same day, we count them separately (i.e., an earnings and 
cash flow forecast issued on the same day are counted as two forecasts).  We also measure total 
disclosure using Disclosures, equal to the sum of the number of forecasts and 8-Ks. For this 
variable, if the firm has a forecast and an 8-K on the same day, we do not count the 8-K under the 
assumption that it relates to the forecast.  We take the log of one plus our disclosure count 
measures, given skewness in these measures.  
                                                          
7 If we repeat our estimation of equation 1 for only Item 8.01 (Other Events) filings, we find the same results as when 
we count all 8-K filings. 
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The variable of interest, Distractioni,t, is based on the Kempf et al. (2017) measure of IO 
distraction.  In Kempf et al., Distractioni,t is measured every calendar quarter using the holdings 
of each IO of each firm.8  To ensure that IO is meaningful and that data is available on sample 
firms, Distractioni,t is calculated excluding micro-cap firms, defined as stocks with market value 
below the 20th NYSE percentile breakpoint following Fama and French (2008). Distractioni,t is 
the weighted average of the firm’s investors’ distractions that quarter, where distractions are 
assigned to investors in industries with the largest or smallest returns that quarter, using the Fama-
French 12 industry classifications.  Taking the weighted average allows us to capture the attention 
of the “representative” shareholder.9 We measure contemporaneous distraction because we expect 
disclosure changes to occur relatively quickly, unlike the merger activity studied in Kempf et al.  
However, in robustness analyses below, we find the same results if examine distraction over a 
three-quarter window.  To facilitate interpretation of our results, we standardize Distraction to 
mean zero and standard deviation of one.  We provide the details of the calculation of Distractioni,t 
in our Appendix A.  Figure 1 provides an intuitive illustration of how the distraction measure is 
constructed.   
It is important to note that the Kempf et al. measure and IO control variables are measured 
at the institution level, not at the fund level.  For example, when the Vanguard Group reports 
holdings in a company, it reports the aggregate holdings of many Vanguard funds that own the 
                                                          
8 In February 2018, Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) issued a statement about quality problems with the 
Thomson Reuters data (https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/news/index.cfm?display=read&news_id=616).  They 
suggest using data gathered by WRDS directly from EDGAR to compute institutional ownership measures starting in 
June 2013, and computing ownership measures as described in Ben-David et al. (2016).  We use this data and the 
Ben-David et al. method to compute our institutional ownership and attention measures starting in June 2013.  As an 
additional step in Table A1 of the online appendix, we repeat our tests on our pre-2013 observations, and find that our 
inferences are unchanged. 
9 As Kempf et al. discuss, “We do not assume that all shareholders are distracted when D is high. We do assume that 
higher D proxies for times when the representative shareholder is distracted: that is, we assume that lack of attention 
by one investor cannot be costlessly and instantaneously compensated for by increased attention by other investors.” 
(p. 1677).  
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company.  Because Vanguard and other institutions typically have a centralized team focused on 
engaging firms on governance and disclosure matters (Vanguard 2018), the relevant distractions 
occur at the institution level, and this is where we measure them. 
If the firm’s industry has the highest or lowest return of all industries that quarter, the 
distraction variable is recorded as missing and the observation is omitted from the analysis.  We 
omit these observations to avoid the endogeneity concern that firms in industries experiencing 
extreme returns may be altering their disclosures for performance reasons, rather than because 
attention is paid to them. 
Kempf et al. validate their distraction measure by showing that when IOs are distracted, 
there is: 1) less trading in the firm’s stock; 2) less conference call participation; and 3) fewer 
shareholder proposals.  In a contemporaneous study, Basu et al. (2017) report that management 
forecasts, non-GAAP disclosures, and conference calls are also negatively associated with the 
Kempf et al. distraction measure.  It is important to note that while the Kempf et al. approach 
exploits exogenous shocks to unrelated parts of institutional shareholders’ portfolios and the 
aggregation of these shocks plausibly proxy for IO attention, we do not have a direct measure 
of IO attention.  For parsimony, we refer to IO attention where we mean “a proxy for IO 
attention.”   
This distraction measure offers two important advantages for our research question.  First, 
distractions to the firm’s institutional shareholder base are exogenous to the firm itself, by 
construction, because they arise from extreme returns in other industries.  By comparison, firm-
specific attention grabbing events (e.g., management turnover, M&A, product releases) have their 
own effect on disclosure, making it difficult to separately identify an attention mechanism.   
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Second, in our setting distraction events occur in different industries over time, and firms’ 
investors have different holdings across industries.  This allows us to not only link transitory 
disclosure changes to variation in short term distractions, but also to control for firm-calendar 
quarter and industry-quarter fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖,𝑞 and 𝛼𝑗,𝑡.  Consistent with Kempf et al. and our 
industry return-based distraction measure detailed above, we use the Fama-French 12 industry 
classification scheme.10  Controlling for industry-quarter fixed effects reduces the threat that 
managers adjust their disclosure to changes in industry-wide competition or profitability, merger 
waves, macroeconomic conditions, or changes in IO holdings across industries.  For example, in 
the event that one industry’s performance (or disclosure strategy) is somehow connected to another 
industry’s extreme returns, the industry-quarter indicators control for any connection effect 
common to all firms in the industry.  Including industry-quarter fixed effects also removes 
variation in disclosure regulation affecting all firms (e.g., the expansion of mandatory 8-K items 
in 2004) from our tests.  In sum, our specification effectively compares disclosure for firms in the 
same industry at the same time, across IOs with high and low portfolio exposure to distraction 
events.  This also aligns our specification with that of Kempf et al., who compare firm actions 
within an industry-time period.   
Performing the estimation within-firm calendar quarter allows us to focus on transitory 
changes in disclosure, while accounting for relatively time-invariant determinants such as the 
firm’s size and growth opportunities.  To create the firm-calendar quarter effect, we take the cross 
product of the four calendar quarters with the firm indicator.  This firm-calendar quarter fixed 
                                                          
10 Our results are the same if we use more granular industry classification schemes (e.g., three-digit NAICS). 
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effect controls for firm-specific seasonal disclosure habits (e.g., the firm always forecasts in the 
first quarter of the year).   
Because of differences in investor base, industry rivals can face different levels of investor 
attention.  To illustrate, consider the consumer nondurables industry in the second quarter of 2011. 
Molson Coors Brewing Co. had a raw (i.e., unstandardized) distraction measure of 0.263, while 
InBev (parent of Anheuser Busch) had a raw distraction measure of 0.178.  This difference arises 
because Molson Coors’ IOs had large portfolio concentrations in energy and healthcare, and these 
industries experienced extreme returns that quarter.   
 Although we expect that our fixed effects structure mitigates many omitted variable-related 
concerns, we also include other control variables that prior literature has associated with either 
institutional ownership or short-term changes in disclosure (e.g., Goodman et al. 2013; Ali et al. 
2014; Kempf et al. 2017).  Specifically, we control for the average percentage of ownership by 
institutions and the percentage of IO by the five largest institutions, both measured at the start of 
the quarter.11  To account for performance, our regressions include firm stock returns last quarter, 
indicators for losses and earnings increases last quarter, and the absolute value of the earnings 
change from five quarters ago to last quarter.12  We control for the number of analysts making 
earnings estimates in the quarter, to account for analyst attention in the firm.13  We also control for 
lag stock return volatility, and firm fundamentals measured at the beginning of the quarter 
                                                          
11 Including these controls and firm fixed effects reduces the concern that our results could be driven by large changes 
in IO, such as those studied by Boone and White (2015) or Bird and Karolyi (2016).  Nevertheless, we repeat our tests 
after controlling for changes in IO and find our results are unaffected. 
12 Our results are the same if we instead measure these performance variables in this quarter, or if we control for 
discretionary accruals as measured in Garel et al. (2017). 
13 We control for contemporaneous coverage to measure current analyst attention in the firm, but our results are the 
same if we control for lag coverage.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3066136 
15 
 
including leverage, size, and the book to market value of assets.  We cluster our standard errors by 
firm and industry-quarter.  Appendix A provides definitions for our control variables.  
3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our disclosure and control variables for the 4,408 
firms in our sample.  Panel A shows that for the typical firm-quarter in our sample, the probability 
of making at least one forecast is 64.2%.  The average number of forecasts is 2.5; conditional on 
making a forecast, the average is 3.9.  The average number of 8-K filings per firm-quarter is 2.8.  
When we combine the number of 8-Ks and forecasts, and drop 8-Ks accompanying forecasts, the 
resulting average number of total disclosures is 4.6.  
Panel B shows that the mean value of Distraction is 0.15 as compared to a mean value of 
0.16 reported in Kempf et al.  This slight difference arises because the availability of control 
variables and the composition of investors’ portfolios differs across our sample and Kempf et al.’s 
sample.  In the typical firm-quarter, IOs own 69.5% of the equity, and the five largest investors 
account for 40.3% of IO.  The average quarterly return is 3.5%.  Seventeen percent (60%) of firms 
experience a loss (EPS increase), and the average lag unsigned EPS change from four quarters ago 
is 10.4%.  At the beginning of the quarter, leverage, market value of equity, and book-to-market 
average 25.1%, $6.7 billion, and 0.70, respectively.  The average lagged return volatility 
(annualized) is 38.1%.  Analyst coverage for the average firm-quarter is 11.0.  
 Table 2 provides a transition matrix examining within-firm changes in Disclosures, 8-Ks 
Forecasts, and Forecast Firm. We study the first calendar quarter for each firm-year, but note that 
our results are similar if we examine other quarters.  Each column compares the first quarter of a 
given year to the first quarter in the prior year, such that a switch measures a change in disclosure 
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from Q1 of one year to Q1 of the next year.  To exclude the effects of composition changes, we 
present figures for a constant sample of firms with observations in each year from 2001 to 2016. 
Requiring a constant sample limits our analysis here to 725 firms.  
In 2001, firms provide an average of 1.67 disclosures per quarter.  In the same quarter of 
2002, 71.2% of firms change the number of disclosures, either increasing (40.4%) or decreasing 
(30.8%) from their 2001 disclosure level.  Panels B and C reveal that slightly more of the change 
in total disclosure comes from transient 8-K filings than transient forecasts.  Nevertheless, there is 
meaningful time series variation in forecast strategy as shown in Panel C: in 2002, 28.8% (21.3%) 
of firms increased (decreased) the number of forecasts provided from their 2001 base.  Changes in 
forecasts are happening mostly along the intensive margin (that is, managers are primarily altering 
the degree to which they forecast conditional on forecasting, rather than altering the decision of 
whether or not to forecast).  While 50.1% of firms changed the number of forecasts between 2001 
and 2002, Panel D shows only 30.6% of firms are just starting or stopping forecasting altogether, 
and this figure declines through 2016, when just 12.1% of firms change their decision to forecast.  
Disclosure changes also occur in subsequent years such that over time, the typical firm has 
adjusted its disclosure strategy multiple times.  By 2016, the average number of switches in 
Disclosures, 8-Ks, and Forecasts since 2001 is 12.1, 10.9, and 8.9, respectively.  By comparison, 
the typical firm only changes its decision of whether or not to provide a forecast 2.4 times over the 
same period.  Moreover, the changes in disclosure we document do not simply reflect a systematic 
expansion in disclosure over the past 16 years.  Although the average level of disclosure has 
increased during this period, firms are roughly equally likely to decrease as increase disclosure in 
most individual years after 2007.  This pattern of small increases and decreases in disclosure is 
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quite different from the large one-time changes associated with index reconstitutions studied in 
related work.   
In sum, although disclosure policy has a permanent component, there is also a significant 
transitory component.  Moreover, the transient component primarily reflects management altering 
the number of forecasts or 8-Ks they provide, rather than changing their decision to provide 
forecasts.  Our next tests study whether changes in investor attention contribute to this transitory 
disclosure behavior.  
4. Results 
4.1 IO distraction and disclosure 
 Table 3, Panel A presents the results of estimating equation (1).  The first column of Panel 
A shows that Distraction is insignificantly negatively related to whether the firm provides 
forecasts.  On the other hand, in Column 2, we find distraction has a significantly negative effect 
on the number of forecasts.  Economically, a one standard deviation increase in Distraction 
reduces the number of forecasts by 5.2%.   
 Columns 3 and 4 study 8-Ks and total disclosure.  The number of 8-Ks declines with 
Distraction.  Again taking into account the standard deviation of attention, the number of 8-Ks is 
2.7% lower in high distraction periods.  Column 4 presents results for Disclosures, which is the 
sum of our forecast and 8-K filing variables after we eliminate 8-Ks on forecast days.  We find the 
number of disclosures is negatively and significantly related to Distraction. A one standard 
deviation increase in Distraction reduces the number of disclosures by 6.4%.  
In terms of the control variables, forecasts are positively related to size, leverage, and 
analyst coverage, and are negatively related to returns, losses, the absolute change in earnings, and 
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stock return volatility.  With the exception of EPS increase, the signs of the control variables in 
our quarterly specification are consistent with Ali et al. (2014), who use an annual specification 
with many of the same controls.  In contrast, in our 8-K specification, losses and stock return 
volatility have signs opposite to those in the forecast specification.  This difference is consistent 
with 8-Ks and forecasts substituting for one another (Noh et al. 2017).  Finally, Disclosures are 
positively related to size, leverage, stock return volatility, and analyst coverage, and are negatively 
related to returns and to the absolute change in earnings.   
Next, in Panel B we subject our initial results to a series of robustness tests.  For brevity, 
we tabulate results for only Disclosures, but note that our findings are similar for other measures 
examined in Table 3, Panel A.  All columns include the same control variables as Panel A, but we 
do not report coefficients for them. 
First, we support our use of Distraction as a continuous measure capturing both attention 
and distraction periods.  Specifically, we calculate Distraction+ and Distraction-, equal to 
Distraction when (standardized) Distraction is greater than and less than or equal to zero, 
respectively, and zero otherwise.  If our initial results were primarily driven by high distraction 
periods, we would expect a significantly negative coefficient on Distraction+ and a null result for 
Distraction-.  However, column 1 shows a significantly negative coefficient for both measures; 
moreover, the magnitude of the two coefficient is not significantly different. 
Second, we assess the sensitivity of our results to an alternative distraction window.  Our 
main specification focuses on contemporaneous distraction, because we expect changes in 
disclosure to occur relatively quickly.  However, one could also envision distraction having an 
effect over multiple quarters, especially considering that return shocks could happen late in a 
quarter.  In column 2, we follow Table 2, Panel B of Kempf et al. (2017) and measure distraction 
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over three quarters (Distraction[-2,0]).14  The coefficient on Distraction[-2,0] is negatively 
significant, and roughly half the size of our original coefficient from Panel A, column 4.  
Third, to test our maintained assumption that our results are coming from changes in IO 
distraction rather than changes in IO composition, we eliminate observations with a 5% or more 
increase or decrease in institutional ownership from the previous quarter.  Despite a 37% reduction 
in our sample, Column 3 shows that we continue to find IO distractions reduce disclosure. 
Fourth, we investigate whether changes in firm fundamentals rather than attention are 
causing our results.  Although we control for industry-quarter effects, and lag returns and 
accounting performance, as an additional step we eliminate firms experiencing significant changes 
in their performance.  Each firm-quarter, we measure the absolute change in EPS, and eliminate 
observations in the highest quartile.  Column 4 shows that our results are the same for the 
remaining firm-quarters, indicating that performance shocks do not explain our results. 
Fifth, in Column 5 we omit financial firms.  For these firms, regulatory oversight and 
reliance on leverage can cause disclosure practices and the investor base to differ from firms in 
other industries.  We find our results are the same when we omit financial firms.   
Last, we define our sample to begin in 1994, 1998, or 2005 instead of 2001.  Our main 
sample starts in 2001 to avoid data issues; however, a number of studies related to ours (e.g., 
Lerman and Livnat 2010; Boone and White 2015; Bird and Karolyi 2016) begin their samples 
before 2001 and we want to assess the sensitivity of our findings to using different windows.  The 
sample beginning in 2005 is governed by a constant set of securities laws with respect to corporate 
                                                          
14 Specifically, we sum Distraction over quarters t-2, t-1, and t, and standardize this sum.  
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governance (i.e., Sarbanes Oxley) and mandatory 8-K filings.  Columns 6-8 shows that our 
inference is the same if we begin in 1994, 1998, or 2005.   
4.2 Does value-destroying behavior or hiding bad news explain the relation between 
distraction and disclosure? 
In this section, we attempt to shed light on why managers’ disclosure choices are sensitive 
to attention.  One possibility is that when given the option, managers decrease disclosure to conceal 
value-destroying actions.  Kempf et al. (2017) find that managers take advantage of distraction 
periods to decrease dividends and undertake diversifying, value-destroying mergers.  Decreasing 
disclosure around such events can make it more difficult for investors to become aware of the 
actions management is carrying out.  Managers may also manipulate disclosure to engage in insider 
trading or to delay the revelation of bad news (Kothari et al. 2009; Zhou and Zhou 2017).  Related 
work finds that managers release more bad news when they think investors are distracted 
(Damodaran 1989; deHaan et al. 2015; Niessner 2015).   
Our next set of tests assesses whether our main finding of a negative relation between 
Disclosures and Distraction is robust to eliminating observations where value-destroying behavior 
or an attempt to hide bad news is most likely.  Our goal with these tests is not to rule out the 
possibility that managers could exploit IO distractions to behave opportunistically.  Rather, our 
goal is to assess whether changes in disclosure we document earlier are primarily coming from 
management attempting to conceal opportunistic behavior by reducing forecasts or 8-Ks.15     
Table 4 repeats our test in column 4 of Table 3, Panel A after eliminating firm-quarters 
where management may have incentives to reduce disclosure to hide value-destroying behavior.  
                                                          
15 For example, managers are required to file 8-Ks for certain events (e.g., dividend decreases), but have discretion for 
others (Gleason et al. 2018).  Managers can also reduce forecasting activity.  
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Column 1 restricts our sample to observations where firms do not undertake a diversifying M&A 
transaction, where we follow Kempf et al. and define a diversifying M&A transaction as a deal for 
more than $1M for a target outside of the acquirer’s two-digit SIC industry.  Column 2 omits firm-
quarters for dividend-paying firms that decreased their dividend from the same quarter last year.  
In Column 3, we measure the profit on insider trades, and omit observations in which insiders earn 
1% or more abnormal profits on their trades.16  Next, we consider scenarios where IO distractions 
could lead to diminished participation in director elections and annual meetings (e.g., Liu et al. 
2017).  Column 4 eliminates observations from the first two fiscal quarters of the year (when 
director elections and annual meetings are concentrated), a restriction costing half of our sample.  
Across all four columns, we continue to find a significantly negative coefficient on Distraction of 
a comparable magnitude to our original result (Table 3, Panel A, Column 4 shows a coefficient of 
-0.064).   
While our tests exclude cases of self-dealing behavior that related literature has linked to 
IO distraction, there are other self-dealing actions that management can take, and management 
could reduce disclosure to conceal these actions.  Similarly, management may reduce disclosure if 
it anticipates bad news and does not want to draw attention to this news.  Rather than attempt to 
rule out each alternative form of self-dealing behavior, we make the assumption that the behavior 
most likely to contaminate our results will reveal itself in the form of poor future stock returns.17  
As a final step in Column 5, we omit firm-quarters with the lowest quintile of industry-adjusted 
                                                          
16 Following Jagolinzer et al. (2011), we measure trade profitability as the intercept from the four factor Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model estimated over the 180 days following each transaction. 
17 As Kempf et al. argue, “many value-destroying actions self-interested managers can take are unobservable to the 
econometrician.  Stock returns can act as a summary measure of the economic impact of these actions” (p. 1689).  
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returns over the next twelve months.  We continue to find a negative relation between disclosure 
and Distraction.18   
In sum, the changes in disclosure we document do not appear to arise from the M&A 
activity and dividend cuts documented in Kempf et al. (2017), more general self-dealing behavior 
resulting in subsequent losses or negative returns, or the desire to hide negative future news.  This 
raises the possibility, investigated in our next tests, that managers make non-substantive 
adjustments to disclosure in response to attention.  
4.3 How does disclosure respond to IO distraction? 
In this section, we explore how forecasting activity responds to distraction.  We decompose 
our quarterly Forecasts variable into EAD Forecasts (equal to the number of forecasts made within 
one day of an earnings announcement) and Non-EAD Forecasts (number of forecasts made not 
within one day of an earnings announcement).  Then, we study which types of forecasts are most 
sensitive to changes in attention.  To do this, we create indicators for two types of core forecasts 
(net earnings and revenues) and two types of secondary forecasts (other income forecasts including 
pre-tax income, EBITDA, and gross margin; and other forecasts including cash flow, capex, and 
dividends).  We view our tests as providing descriptive evidence of how disclosure responds to IO 
attention, which helps motivate our later analyses of the consequences of disclosure responses.  
Table 5 summarizes these forecast variables, conditional on a forecast being made during 
the quarter.  The typical firm makes 2.9 (0.9) EAD Forecasts (Non-EAD Forecasts) during the 
quarter.  Net earnings and revenue forecasts are provided in 72% and 48% of the quarters, 
                                                          
18 Our results are also similar if we model forecasts or 8-Ks separately rather than total disclosures.  
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respectively, while other income forecasts and other forecasts are provided in 23% and 46% of the 
quarters, respectively.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 model EAD Forecasts and Non-EAD Forecasts using equation 
(1).  We find that only EAD Forecasts is responsive to IO attention.  Therefore, the sensitivity of 
forecasts to IO attention documented in our main results is primarily operating through the 
intensive margin (managers adding new forecasts conditional on forecasting around the EAD) 
instead of the extensive margin (managers, for example, adding mid-quarter forecasts).  Columns 
3 and 4 find that the provision of net earnings and revenue forecasts are not significantly related 
to IO attention.  Columns 5 and 6 study the secondary forecasts, and find that both other income 
and other forecasts vary significantly with attention.19  
Together, these tests offer evidence consistent with managers’ forecast choices being 
responsive to IO attention.  Forecast changes occur through shifts in the number of forecasts on or 
around earnings announcements, rather than additions of new forecasts during other times in the 
quarter.  In response to attention, managers are more likely to adjust forecasts for secondary than 
core items.  Our next tests study the consequences of these and other disclosure adjustments.  
4.4 Attention-driven disclosure, information quality, and liquidity 
In Table 3, Panel A, we found that increases in attention lead to a 5.2% increase in forecasts 
and a 6.4% increase in total 8-Ks and forecasts.  If increases in disclosure lead to meaningful 
improvements in information quality, we expect that the incremental disclosure will have 
comparable information quality to the preceding disclosure.  Likewise, if attention makes IOs 
                                                          
19 We obtain similar results on a smaller sample if we drop observations prior to 2007.  Coverage of capital expenditure 
forecasts in I/B/E/S Guidance is incomplete prior to 2007 (Huang 2018). 
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better at interpreting disclosure, then the incremental disclosure will have high information quality. 
Finally, if attention leads to managers making more timely disclosure, this also will lead to higher 
information quality.  However, if managers respond to attention with uninformative disclosures, 
or if there are decreasing returns to disclosure, the incremental disclosure will have low 
information quality.   
To investigate these alternative hypotheses, we would like to study the information quality 
of the incremental disclosure, but we cannot observe when this incremental disclosure occurs.  To 
sidestep this issue, we instead study total information quality during the quarter.  The change in 
total information quality is equal to the incremental information quality.  For example, if attention 
causes a 6.4% increase in information quality, we interpret this magnitude as evidence that 
attention does not reduce the quality of the incremental disclosure.  
We study three sets of variables: forecast properties (Horizon and Precision), market-based 
information quality measures (Abnormal Volatility and Abnormal Volume), and liquidity measures 
(Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread and Abnormal Depth).  We follow the same three steps to calculate 
each of these variables. First, we measure the variable at each disclosure date. (If we study 8-K 
and forecast dates separately, it does not affect our inferences).  Second, we total the variable over 
the quarter.  Third, we take the logarithm of the total.  If the incremental disclosure increases (has 
no effect on) information quality, we expect a significantly positive (insignificant) coefficient on 
Horizon, Precision, Abnormal Volatility, Abnormal Volume and Abnormal Depth, and a 
significantly negative (insignificant) coefficient on Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread. 
We compute these variables as follows:  Horizon is the fraction of a year from the forecast 
to the forecasted fiscal period end.  All else equal, longer horizon forecasts provide more 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3066136 
25 
 
information about future performance to investors.  We measure forecast Precision following 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) as equal to 4 for point estimates, 3 for range estimates, 2 for open-
ended estimates, and 1 for qualitative estimates.  For both of these measures, we follow Boone and 
White (2015) and delete pre-earnings announcement forecasts made after the fiscal quarter end but 
prior to the earnings announcement.20  We only examine Horizon and Precision for the 64,497 
observations for which a non-pre-earnings announcement forecast is made, and compute the total 
value of Horizon and Precision over the quarter.21  Table 7 shows that the sample means for these 
total forecast variables are 1.8 years and 10.7, respectively.  Since the typical forecasting firm 
makes about four forecasts per quarter, the sample mean horizon per forecast and mean precision 
per forecast are 0.45 years and 2.7 (a range estimate), respectively. 
Prior literature finds that abnormal volatility and abnormal volume increase in the amount 
of information in a disclosure release (e.g., Lerman and Livnat 2010).  Following Lerman and 
Livnat (2010), Announcement Abnormal Volatility is the average of squared abnormal returns 
during the three days surrounding the disclosure date, divided by the variance of the abnormal 
returns between 63 and eight days before the disclosure date. To ensure that our calculation is not 
affected by prior disclosures (which could mechanically affect the measure around subsequent 
disclosures), we exclude the three trading days around any prior disclosures during the non-event 
period. Abnormal returns are measured as the daily return on the stock minus the return on the 
value-weighted market portfolio.  We then sum this variable across all the disclosure dates in the 
quarter, and omit quarters without disclosure.  Similarly, we calculate Announcement Abnormal 
                                                          
20 Pre-earnings announcement forecasts made after the fiscal quarter have negative horizon. 
21 One potential drawback of conditioning on the provision of a forecast is that forecasting is a choice. Although 
identifying a suitable instrument for this selection issue is challenging, we note that Table 2, Panel D shows the choice 
to forecast is relatively stable within-firm, and that our tests include firm fixed effects. 
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Volume as the average volume in the three days around the disclosure date, divided by the average 
volume between 63 and eight days before the disclosure date, again excluding the three trading 
days around any disclosures during the non-event period.  We calculate volume as the number of 
shares traded divided by shares outstanding to ensure that the volume measure is unaffected by 
stock splits.  As before, we sum the variable across all the disclosure dates in the quarter, and 
transform it by taking the natural logarithm.  Table 7 shows that the total volatility (volume) around 
disclosure days in a given quarter is 13.0 times (5.6 times) its value in the non-event period.  Since 
the typical firm makes multiple disclosures per quarter, the average abnormal volatility (volume) 
per disclosure day is 4.5 times (1.7 times) its value in the non-event period.  
Third, we study liquidity (as proxied by bid-ask spread and depth) on disclosure days.  
Informative disclosures should improve liquidity by reducing spreads and increasing depths.  We 
use the DTAQ database to compute average daily percent quoted bid-ask spreads and depths for 
each firm-day over our sample period.  Daily percent spread is the daily average of each quote's 
spread, calculated as the difference between an offer price and a bid price divided by the midpoint 
of the offer and bid price.  The daily depth is the daily average of each quote’s depth, calculated 
as the sum of the dollar offer size and the dollar bid size.  Both the depth and the spread are time-
weighted during trading hours for each day according to the procedure described in Holden and 
Jacobsen (2014).  Data on these variables is missing for about 1,100 observations in our sample.  
As with our other abnormal measures, we compute the average values in the non-event period 
between 63 and eight days before the disclosure date, again excluding the three trading days around 
any disclosures during the non-event period. We continue to omit quarters without disclosure.  The 
resulting variables are Announcement Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread and Announcement Abnormal 
Depth.  In our sample, the total spread (total depth) around disclosure days in a given quarter is 
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345% (362%) of its value in the non-event period.  Again, since the typical firm makes multiple 
disclosures per quarter, the average abnormal spread (depth) per disclosure day is 1.0 times (1.1 
times) its value in the non-event period. 
Because one might expect the effect of disclosure to be strongest not on but after the 
disclosure dates, we also study abnormal information quality and liquidity over the entire quarter.  
To do this, we total the four daily measures described above over the whole quarter.  With volume, 
for example, we sum the ratio of daily shares traded to shares outstanding over all trading days of 
the quarter.  To compute the expected amount, we use the total daily amount over the prior quarter.  
We compute the ratio of this quarter’s value to last quarter’s value, and transform it by taking the 
natural logarithm.  The resulting variables, Quarter Abnormal Volatility, Quarter Abnormal 
Volume, Quarter Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread, and Quarter Abnormal Depth, have median values 
that are approximately equal to one, suggesting that typical disclosure quality does not differ across 
quarters.  Note that these variables are missing for some observations generally because data is not 
available in the previous quarter. 
Table 8, Panel A presents the results of estimating equation (1) for our forecast variables.  
Column 1 shows a significant 5.3% decrease in Horizon when IO attention decreases.  As 
discussed above, there is a 5.2% decline in forecast quantity with a one standard deviation increase 
in Distraction (Column 2 of Table 3, Panel A), so this 5.3% decrease in Horizon suggests that the 
Horizon of the incremental forecast(s) is economically and statistically similar to the previous 
average.22  In contrast, there is no significant change in total precision, which implies that the 
precision of the incremental forecast is low. 
                                                          
22 Our Table 6 results suggest these new forecasts are for secondary items.  
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In Panel B, we study the market-based measures of information quality.  Columns 1 and 2 
show that abnormal volatility and abnormal volume on disclosure days are not significantly related 
to Distraction.  We arrive at the same inference if we study abnormal volatility and abnormal 
volume over the full quarter.  Thus, while management responds to IO attention with more 
disclosure quantity, the incremental disclosures have low information quality.  
Panel C models our liquidity variables using equation (1).  In the bid-ask spread 
regressions, we include the prior quarter average depth as a control, and in the depth regressions, 
we include the prior quarter average bid-ask spread as a control.  We do this following Bushee et 
al. (2010) and Blankespoor et al. (2014) to control for the fact that market makers can protect 
themselves against information asymmetry by increasing spreads or reducing depths, and they can 
offset a change in spreads with a change in depth in the opposite direction (Bushee et al. 2010; 
Yohn 1998).  We find no relation between attention and spreads or depths on disclosure days.  
However, in Columns 3 and 4, where we study liquidity over the entire quarter, we find a 
significant 1.9% reduction in the bid-ask spread in response to one standard deviation increase in 
attention.  This reduction represents under 30% of the 6.4% decrease in disclosure reported in 
column 4 of Table 3, Panel A, and the two coefficients are significantly different (p-value < 0.05).  
In addition, we find a marginally significant 1.2% reduction in depth (and, the p-value for the 
difference in Distraction coefficients across the disclosure and depth regressions is 0.005).  The 
combination of a reduction in both spread and depth suggests little overall change in liquidity: the 
increase in liquidity from the reduced bid-ask spread is largely offset by a decrease in liquidity 
from the reduction in depth. 
In Table A2 of the online appendix, we conduct additional tests to establish the robustness 
of our Table 8 results.  Specifically, we demonstrate our findings are not affected by studying 
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wider distraction windows, conditioning our sample on changes in disclosure, eliminating firm-
quarters where future returns are poor, or employing an instrumental variables specification.   
We interpret our results as showing that IO attention-driven changes in disclosure have 
little effect on information quality or liquidity.  However, we acknowledge that null results cannot 
be proven, and that weaknesses in any study’s hypothesis development or design can generate null 
findings.  For example, null results can arise because there is no clear theoretical link between the 
variables being examined.  We test the relation between voluntary disclosure and liquidity, which 
both theoretical and empirical literature show are positively related (Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991; Welker 1995; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).  A lack of power or endogeneity can also cause 
non-results.  We study plausibly exogenous changes in disclosure in a panel of roughly 100,000 
firm-quarters, reducing concerns that problems with our research design prevent us from detecting 
a link between IO-attention-driven disclosure, information quality, and liquidity.   
4.5 Attention by passive vs. non-passive IOs 
Thus far, we have focused on aggregate attention from all IOs.  However, the increased 
share of investment by passive IOs has raised interest in the differences between passive and non-
passive IO monitoring (e.g., Appel et al. 2016; Malenko and Shen 2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 
2017).  Passive IOs have to oversee more firms at a lower cost than their actively managed 
counterparts, have little incentive or ability to collect private information, and are less likely to 
specialize by industry.  Monitoring is still important to passive investors, however, because passive 
investors have limited ability to sell shares in underperforming firms (Romano 1993).  Public 
disclosure is therefore an important, low cost way for passive IOs to monitor.   
We now explore differences in attention between active and passive IOs.  Doing so helps 
us understand differences in monitoring across passive and non-passive IOs, and explore whether 
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these differences explain why attention seems to carry little information quality or liquidity 
consequence.  One limitation of this analysis is that by separately analyzing passive and non-
passive investors, we ignore potential interactions between them.  The Kempf et al. measure for 
all IOs has fewer of these problems because aggregation cancels across-IO effects.  Our results 
using the separate measures should therefore be interpreted with caution.  
We define passive IOs as quasi-index investors using the classification scheme of Bushee 
(2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000).23  We calculate Passive IO Distractioni,t and Non-Passive IO 
Distractioni,t, which are separate distraction measures for each IO type based on the Kempf et al. 
(2017) IO distraction measure described above. The typical firm in our sample has 150 passive 
IOs and 67 non-passive IOs.  Again, to facilitate interpretation of our results, we standardize 
Passive IO Distraction and Non-Passive IO Distraction to mean zero and standard deviation of 
one.  We use the same specification as in equation (1), except that we use the separate distraction 
measures, and we control separately for the average percentage of ownership by passive and non-
passive institutions, the percentage of IO by the five largest passive and non-passive IOs, and the 
percentage of institutional ownership held by passive institutional investors in the firm at the 
beginning of the quarter.  
Table 9, Panel A extends the results from Table 3 to study the relation between both passive 
and non-passive distractions and disclosure.  As in Table 3, Panel A neither Passive IO Distraction 
nor Non-Passive IO Distraction are significantly negatively related to whether the firm provides 
forecasts.  In Column 2, we find both types of distraction have a significantly negative effect on 
the number of forecasts.  Column 3 shows that the number of 8-Ks declines with only Passive IO 
                                                          
23 According to Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000), quasi-indexers consist of purely passive index funds and 
active funds that are effectively passive in that they trade infrequently and closely benchmark against indexes.  
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Distraction.  Column 4 presents results for Disclosures.  We find the number of disclosures is over 
three times more sensitive to Passive IO Distraction than it is to Non-Passive IO Distraction.  As 
shown near the bottom of the table, the difference in the Passive IO Distraction and Non-Passive 
IO Distraction coefficients is significant at the 1% level for forecasts, 8-Ks, and Disclosures.  Our 
Panel A findings are consistent with passive IOs’ distractions having a larger effect on disclosure 
than non-passive IOs’ distractions. 
Given that passive IOs are driving the change in disclosure, we next revisit the information 
quality and liquidity consequences of these changes.  Table 9, Panel B extends the results from 
Table 8 to study both passive and non-passive distractions.  For brevity, these tests study the 
information quality and liquidity measures over the full quarter, but we find similar results using 
our announcement day measures (untabulated).  
Column 1 shows a significant reduction in Horizon when Passive IO Distraction increases.  
Considering that Panel A shows a significant 3.7% decline in forecast quantity with a one standard 
deviation increase in Passive Distraction, the 4.3% decrease in Horizon suggests that the Horizon 
of the incremental disclosures is roughly the same as the previous average.  We have the same 
result in Table 8; what is new here is that the change is being driven by passive IOs.  Columns 2 
to 4 show insignificant relations between passive or non-passive IO attention and precision, 
volatility, and volume.  These results are also in line with our Table 8 findings. 
Finally, columns 5 and 6 show a significant 1.3% increase in the bid-ask spread and a 
significant 1.7% increase in depth when Passive IO Distraction increases.  Similar to Table 8, the 
combination of a reduction in both spread and depth in response to an increase in attention suggests 
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little change in overall liquidity when Passive IO Distraction increases.  Again, what is new here 
is that the change in liquidity (and disclosure) is being driven by passive IOs. 
Our finding that passive IOs are driving significant changes in disclosure that carry little 
information quality or liquidity effect is consistent with recent work on IO monitoring.  
Specifically, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) caution that passive investors often employ uniform 
rules-based monitoring techniques that are not effective for more complicated situations, and in 
some cases impose unnecessary costs on management.  Consistent with disclosure being costly 
and IOs asking management for incremental disclosures, we find that managers increase disclosure 
when more attention is paid to them, but that these adjustments have no overall effect on 
information quality or liquidity.  Because passive IOs comprise a large share of total ownership 
and participate in shareholder votes, managers have incentives to respond to passive IO requests 
for disclosure. 
5. Conclusion 
 We hold IO constant, and examine how exogenous short-term changes in IO attention affect 
managements’ short-term disclosure choices, and the resulting information asymmetry and liquidity 
consequences.  For our sample of firms from 2001-2016, we find that managers regularly undertake 
minor adjustments to their disclosure policy, frequently changing the number of disclosures 
provided but rarely changing the overall decision to forecast.  We find that IO attention helps explain 
these short-term changes: a one standard deviation increase in IO attention increases disclosure by 
6.4%.  These results are not driven by firm or industry-level shocks to fundamentals, and are not 
consistent with management simply taking advantage of distraction windows to conceal 
opportunistic behavior or bad news.  Attention from passive rather than non-passive investors drives 
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the disclosure variation.  Adjustments to disclosure in response to attention appear relatively minor 
in that managers rarely change the overall decision to disclose on a given day, and any alterations 
occur through less informative types of disclosures.  Although we find attention increases the 
quantity of disclosure, we find no overall change in abnormal returns, abnormal volume, or liquidity.  
In sum, our evidence suggests that management responds to temporary IO attention by making 
disclosures that have little effect on information quality or liquidity.  
 Our results offer a novel contribution to the literature studying management disclosure 
choices.  Whereas prior work typically models disclosure as a persistent decision with significant 
consequences for information quality and liquidity, we show that managers make frequent but 
inconsequential disclosure changes in response to fleeting IO attention.  In this way, our results also 
add to recent work studying the effectiveness of passive IO monitoring (e.g., Kempf et al. 2017; 
Appel et al. 2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017).   
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides definitions for variables used throughout the paper.  
Distraction Variables Description 
Distraction Based on the Kempf et al. 2017 investor distraction measure.  
Distraction is calculated using the following equation: 
 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑡−1  ×  𝑤𝑓𝑡−1





𝐹𝑡−1 refers to the set of firm 𝑖’s institutional investors at the end 
of quarter t-1, 𝐼𝑁𝐷 refers to Fama-French 12 industries, and 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 refers to firm 𝑖’s industry.  The weight 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑡−1 considers 
how large investor 𝑓’s stake is in firm 𝑖, and how much of 𝑓’s 
portfolio is comprised of the investment in 𝑖.  The calculation for 
this weight is provided in equation 2 of Kempf et al. 2017.  𝑤𝑓𝑡−1
𝐼𝑁𝐷  
is the weight of industry 𝐼𝑁𝐷 in investor 𝑓’s portfolio at the end 
of last quarter. 𝐼𝑆𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝐷is an indicator for whether that industry had 
the highest or lowest returns of all Fama-French 12 industries 
that quarter.   
 
To facilitate interpretation of our results, we standardize the 
variable to mean zero and standard deviation of one (by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation) to 
facilitate comparison. 




Equal to Distraction when Distraction is less than or equal to 
zero, and zero otherwise. 
Distraction[-2,0] Distraction measured over three quarters.  Specifically, we sum 
Distraction for the firm over quarters t -2, t -1, and  t and then 





Forecast Firm An indicator equal to one if the firm makes a forecast that 
quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Forecasts The natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts by the 
firm that quarter. 
8-Ks  The natural logarithm of one plus the number of 8-K filings by 
the firm that quarter. 
Disclosures The natural logarithm of one plus the sum of forecasts and 8-Ks 
by the firm that quarter.  If the firm has a forecast and an 8-K on 
the same day, we do not count the 8-K under the assumption that 
it relates to the forecast. 
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EAD Forecasts The natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts by the 
firm that quarter within one day of an earnings announcement. 
Non-EAD Forecasts The natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts by the 
firm that quarter not within one day of an earnings 
announcement. 
Earnings Forecast  An indicator equal to one if the firm made an earnings forecast 
during the quarter, and zero otherwise.  We count all forecasts of 
net earnings, including earnings per share, net income, ROE, and 
ROA. 
Revenue Forecast  An indicator equal to one if the firm made a revenue forecast 
during the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Other Income Forecast  An indicator equal to one if the firm made an other earnings 
forecast during the quarter, and zero otherwise.  We count all 
forecasts of non-bottom line earnings, including pre-tax income, 
EBITDA, and gross margin. 
Other Forecast  An indicator equal to one if the firm made an other forecast 
during the quarter, and zero otherwise.  We count all forecasts of 





Horizon The fraction of a year from the date of the forecast until the end 
of the forecast period.  We total the variable over all forecasts in 
the quarter, add one, and take natural logarithm. 
Precision The natural logarithm of one plus forecast precision.  Following 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), forecast precision equals 4 for 
point estimates, 3 for range estimates, 2 for open-ended estimates 
and 1 for qualitative estimates.  We total the variable over all 
forecasts in the quarter, add one, and take natural logarithm. 
Announcement Abnormal 
Volatility 
The average of squared abnormal returns during the three days 
around the disclosure date, scaled by the average of squared 
abnormal returns in days -63 through -8 prior to the disclosure 
date excluding the three trading days around any disclosures 
during the non-event period.  Abnormal returns are calculated as 
the daily return on a stock minus the return on the value-weighted 
market portfolio.  We total the variable over all disclosure dates 
in the quarter and take the natural logarithm. 
Announcement Abnormal 
Volume 
The average shares traded/shares outstanding in the three days 
around the disclosure date, scaled by average shares 
traded/shares outstanding in days -63 through -8 prior to the 
disclosure date excluding the three trading days around any 
disclosures during the non-event period.  We total the variable 
over all disclosure dates in the quarter and take the natural 
logarithm.  
Quarter Abnormal Volatility The natural logarithm of total daily squared abnormal returns in 
quarter scaled by total squared abnormal returns in the prior 
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quarter.  Abnormal returns are calculated as the daily return on a 
stock minus the return on the value-weighted market portfolio.  
Quarter Abnormal Volume The natural logarithm of total daily shares traded/shares 
outstanding in quarter scaled by total shares traded/shares 
outstanding in the prior quarter.  
  
Liquidity Variables  
Announcement Abnormal 
Bid-Ask Spread 
The average bid-ask spread over the three days around the 
disclosure date, divided by the average bid-ask spread over days 
-63 through -8 prior to the disclosure date excluding the three 
trading days around any disclosures during the non-event period. 
We gather quote data from DTAQ, and compute the daily 
average of each quote's spread, calculated as the difference 
between an offer price and a bid price divided by the midpoint of 
the offer and bid price where the spread is time-weighted during 
trading hours for each day according to the procedure described 
in Holden and Jacobsen (2014).  We total the variable over all 
disclosure dates in the quarter and take the natural logarithm. 
Announcement Abnormal 
Depth 
The average depth measure over the three days around the 
disclosure date, divided by the average depth measure over days 
-63 through -8 prior to the disclosure date excluding the three 
trading days around any disclosures during the non-event period.  
The daily depth is the daily average of each quote’s depth, 
calculated using DTAQ as the sum of the dollar offer size and 
the dollar bid size where the depth is time-weighted during 
trading hours for each day according to the procedure described 
in Holden and Jacobsen (2014).  We total the variable over all 
disclosure dates in the quarter and take the natural logarithm. 
Quarter Abnormal Bid-Ask 
Spread 
The natural logarithm of [the average bid-ask spread over the 
quarter, divided by the average bid-ask spread over the prior 
quarter]. 
Quarter Abnormal Depth The natural logarithm of [the average Depth measure over 
quarter, divided by the average Depth measure over the prior 
quarter].  
  
Control Variables  
Institutional Ownershipt-1 The percentage ownership by institutional investors at the 
beginning of the quarter. 
Institutional Ownership  
Top 5t-1 
The percentage of institutional ownership held by the five largest 
institutional investors in the firm at the beginning of the quarter. 
Returnst-1 Stock returns for the firm last quarter.  
Losst-1 An indicator equal to one if the firm reports a loss last quarter. 
EPS Increaset-1 An indicator equal to one if the firm reports an increase in 
earnings per share last quarter compared to five quarters ago. 
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Absolute EPS Changet-1 The absolute value of the firm’s change in earnings from five 
quarters ago to last quarter deflated by the stock price four 
quarters ago. 
Leveraget-1 The leverage ratio for the firm, measured at the beginning of the 
quarter. 
Sizet-1 The natural logarithm of the market value of equity for the firm, 
measured at the beginning of the quarter. 
Book-to-Markett-1 The book-to-market ratio of assets for the firm, measured at the 
beginning of the quarter. 
Return Volatilityt-1 The natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily returns 
for the firm last quarter. 
Analyst Coveraget The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts 
providing an earnings estimate for the firm that quarter. 
 
Table 9 Variables  
Passive IO Distraction A measure of Distraction calculated for passive investors only.  
We standardize the variable to mean zero and standard deviation 
of one (by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation) to facilitate comparison between passive and non-
passive IO distraction.  Passive investors are defined as quasi-
index investors using the classification scheme of Bushee (2001) 
and Bushee and Noe (2000). 
Non-Passive IO Distraction A measure of Distraction calculated for non-passive investors 
only.  We standardize the variable to mean zero and standard 
deviation of one (by subtracting the mean and dividing by the 
standard deviation) to facilitate comparison between passive and 
non-passive IO distraction.  Non-Passive investors are defined 
using the classification scheme of Bushee (2001) and Bushee and 
Noe (2000). 
Passive IO as a % of IOt-1 The percentage of institutional ownership held by passive 
institutional investors in the firm at the beginning of the quarter. 
Passive Institutional 
Ownershipt-1 
The percentage ownership by passive institutional investors at 
the beginning of the quarter. 
Non-Passive Institutional 
Ownershipt-1 
The percentage ownership by non-passive institutional investors 
at the beginning of the quarter. 
Passive Institutional 
Ownership Top 5t-1 
The percentage of institutional ownership held by the five largest 
passive institutional investors in the firm at the beginning of the 
quarter. 
Non-Passive Institutional 
Ownership Top 5t-1 
The percentage of institutional ownership held by the five largest 
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Figure 1: Measurement of Distraction and Research Design 
This figure provides a stylized illustration of the Kempf et al. distraction measure. 
Consider two institutional investors, IO1 and IO2.  IO1 owns all of the shares of an energy firm and 
all of the shares of a retail firm, Energy1 and Retail1.  IO2 owns all of the shares of a different retail 
firm and all of the shares of a manufacturing firm, Retail2 and Manu1.  All four firms are the same 
size.  Therefore, IO1 (IO2) has a 50% exposure to both the energy and retail industries (retail and 
manufacturing industries).  This quarter, the energy and healthcare industries experienced extreme 
returns.  
 
In this illustration, Distraction is calculated as the product of: 
a. The share of the firm owned by the IO at the start of the quarter (wift-1);24 
b. The weight of other industries in the IO’s portfolio at the start of the quarter (wft-1IND); and 
c. An indicator for whether the other industries have extreme returns that quarter (IStIND). 
 
 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑡−1  ×  𝑤𝑓𝑡−1





Therefore, Distraction for the two retail firms, Retail1 and Retail2, is calculated as follows: 
wift-1     x wft-1
IND    x ISt
IND  
Distraction Retail1 =      1.0      x  0.5          x  1 = 0.50 (IO1 exposed to energy) 
Distraction Retail2 =      1.0      x  0.5          x 0 = 0.00 (IO2 not exposed to energy) 
Because our research design includes industry x quarter fixed effects, we effectively compare 
disclosure behavior for Retail1 and Retail2, who face different levels of Distraction through their 
IO base.  Our equation (1) specification also calculates separate Distraction measures for passive 
and non-passive IOs, and accounts for firm-specific disclosure habits and a host of controls for 
causes of disclosure unrelated to attention.  
 
                                                          
24 In practice, the weight wift-1  incorporates both how large investor 𝑓’s stake is in firm 𝑖, and how much of 𝑓’s portfolio 
is comprised of the investment in 𝑖.  The exact calculation for this weight is provided in equation 2 of Kempf et al. 
2017. 
IO1 IO2
Energy1 Retail1 Retail2 Manu1
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in our main tests.  The sample consists 
of 100,378 quarterly observations from 2001-2016.  The top panel describes the disclosure 
variables, while the bottom panel describes the Distraction and control variables.  To facilitate 
interpretation, we report statistics for the raw version of our disclosure, size, and return volatility 
variables, while our regressions use logarithmic transformations.  See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
Panel A: Disclosure Variables 
 
Panel B: Distraction and Control Variables 
      
Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% N
Forecast Firm 0.642 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 100,378
Forecasts 2.505 3.215 0.000 1.000 4.000 100,378
8-Ks 2.769 2.300 1.000 2.000 4.000 100,378
Disclosures 4.576 3.718 2.000 4.000 6.000 100,378
Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% N
Distractiont (unstandardized) 0.146 0.081 0.080 0.124 0.210 100,378
Distractiont (standardized) 0.000 1.000 -0.821 -0.280 0.781 100,378
Institutional Ownershipt-1 0.695 0.263 0.541 0.757 0.900 100,378
Institutional Ownership Top 5t-1 0.403 0.151 0.304 0.374 0.467 100,378
Returnst-1 0.035 0.222 -0.074 0.031 0.135 100,378
Losst-1 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 100,378
EPS Increaset-1 0.596 0.491 0.000 1.000 1.000 100,378
Absolute EPS Changet-1 0.104 16.698 0.002 0.005 0.013 100,378
Leveraget-1 0.251 0.205 0.074 0.225 0.378 100,378
Sizet-1 (millions) 6,678 15,000 513 886 1,884 100,378
Book-to-Markett-1 0.698 0.317 0.469 0.691 0.905 100,378
Return Volatilityt-1 0.381 0.228 0.230 0.321 0.459 100,378
Analyst Coveraget 10.992 7.776 3.000 5.000 9.000 100,378
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Table 2: Voluntary Disclosure Transition Matrix 
Panel A studies within-firm changes in Disclosures. Panels B, C, and D report the changes in 
Disclosure resulting from 8-Ks, Forecasts, and Forecast Firm.  Each panel summarizes the 
average value for the given disclosure variable, the probability of increasing or decreasing 
disclosure from the same quarter of the previous year, and the cumulative number of switches to 
that year.  We study the first quarter of the year for each firm.  The sample consists of first quarter 
observations from 2001-2016 for firms with observations in each quarter.  See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. 





Year Avg # Prob (Increase Prob (Decrease Cumulative 
Disclosures from t-1 year) from t-1 year) Switches
2001 1.67
2002 1.92 40.4% 30.8% 0.712
2003 2.67 49.3% 22.7% 1.423
2004 4.48 64.8% 18.9% 2.247
2005 6.32 64.7% 20.0% 3.123
2006 7.02 50.0% 34.0% 3.926
2007 6.04 32.4% 58.1% 4.923
2008 5.56 39.1% 44.6% 5.678
2009 5.60 39.1% 46.6% 6.549
2010 5.39 39.9% 41.0% 7.356
2011 5.77 43.3% 35.9% 8.150
2012 5.79 40.7% 39.5% 8.947
2013 5.49 38.0% 41.8% 9.632
2014 5.52 42.5% 39.6% 10.553
2015 5.43 41.0% 38.2% 11.331
2016 5.33 40.7% 42.0% 12.129
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Panel B: 8-Ks 
Year Avg # Prob (Increase Prob (Decrease Cumulative 
8-Ks from t-1 year) from t-1 year) Switches
2001 0.98
2002 1.09 29.4% 24.3% 0.537
2003 1.58 42.6% 20.3% 1.164
2004 2.48 59.0% 17.9% 1.947
2005 3.80 63.1% 16.5% 2.745
2006 3.75 38.6% 38.6% 3.467
2007 3.58 31.3% 45.7% 4.279
2008 3.51 33.4% 41.9% 5.099
2009 3.55 37.8% 39.1% 5.789
2010 3.14 32.4% 41.9% 6.578
2011 3.28 36.7% 33.7% 7.282
2012 3.33 36.2% 35.3% 8.014
2013 3.42 32.6% 39.5% 8.724
2014 3.08 36.7% 35.5% 9.433
2015 3.22 39.3% 32.0% 10.161
2016 3.13 35.9% 38.8% 10.885
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Year Avg # Prob (Increase Prob (Decrease Cumulative 
Forecasts from t-1 year) from t-1 year) Switches
2001 0.83
2002 1.01 28.8% 21.3% 0.501
2003 1.33 30.2% 18.2% 0.969
2004 2.78 45.8% 12.9% 1.558
2005 3.48 36.5% 26.1% 2.242
2006 4.25 45.6% 21.5% 2.813
2007 3.57 28.1% 47.2% 3.905
2008 3.04 37.2% 32.0% 4.066
2009 3.25 29.2% 40.0% 5.191
2010 3.20 28.8% 29.7% 5.535
2011 3.53 33.6% 23.2% 6.147
2012 3.43 28.2% 30.7% 6.672
2013 2.91 31.9% 26.8% 6.813
2014 3.39 29.5% 30.7% 7.912
2015 3.12 27.6% 29.0% 8.390
2016 3.10 27.9% 30.4% 8.903
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Panel D: Forecast Firm 
  
Year Avg Prob (Increase Prob (Decrease Cumulative 
Forecast Firm from t-1 year) from t-1 year) Switches
2001 0.41
2002 0.46 16.7% 14.1% 0.306
2003 0.51 14.9% 9.0% 0.534
2004 0.64 18.5% 5.6% 0.802
2005 0.70 10.4% 6.8% 0.967
2006 0.73 12.3% 5.1% 1.099
2007 0.81 7.3% 9.7% 1.281
2008 0.75 12.3% 6.9% 1.471
2009 0.84 6.6% 7.5% 1.604
2010 0.75 4.8% 6.3% 1.710
2011 0.78 6.1% 4.0% 1.773
2012 0.77 4.1% 4.5% 1.908
2013 0.77 8.1% 4.3% 2.135
2014 0.80 4.6% 5.1% 2.104
2015 0.80 4.6% 4.9% 2.183
2016 0.76 4.5% 7.6% 2.354
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Table 3: Disclosures and IO Distraction 
This table presents OLS regressions estimating equation (1).  The sample consists of 100,378 
quarterly observations from 2001-2016.  Panel A models the incidence and frequency of various 
disclosures.  Panel B provides robustness analyses for these results.  In Panel B, Column 3 
eliminates firms whose IO increased or decreased by 5% or more from the previous quarter.  
Column 4 eliminates firm-quarters in the highest quartile of absolute earnings changes.  Column 
5 eliminates financial firms, defined by membership in Fama-French industry 11.  Column 6 (7, 
8) begins the sample in 1994 (1998, 2005).  For brevity, we do not report coefficients for the 
control variables included in Table 3, Panel B, although our tests include them.  See Appendix A 
for variable definitions.  Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics based on standard errors 
that are clustered by firm and industry-quarter.    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-
tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Disclosures 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Forecast Firm Forecasts 8-Ks Disclosures
Distractiont -0.012 -0.052*** -0.027** -0.064***
[-1.12] [-2.60] [-2.17] [-3.95]
Institutional Ownershipt-1 0.033* 0.057** -0.051** -0.014
[1.95] [2.14] [-2.56] [-0.64]
Institutional Ownership Top 5t-1 0.007 0.061* 0.090*** 0.061**
[0.34] [1.91] [4.64] [2.50]
Returnst-1 -0.026*** -0.053*** -0.009 -0.026***
[-3.26] [-4.66] [-0.98] [-2.65]
Losst-1 -0.025*** -0.042*** 0.039*** 0.012
[-4.13] [-4.46] [6.00] [1.61]
EPS Increaset-1 0.002 0.002 -0.014*** -0.005
[0.56] [0.39] [-4.30] [-1.33]
Absolute EPS Changet-1 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001**
[-0.55] [-2.29] [0.72] [-2.53]
Leveraget-1 0.059** 0.110** 0.043 0.085**
[2.39] [2.54] [1.58] [2.58]
Sizet-1 0.045*** 0.082*** 0.010 0.051***
[5.72] [6.16] [1.18] [5.05]
Book-to-Markett-1 0.009 0.001 0.007 -0.015
[0.45] [0.03] [0.28] [-0.58]
Return Volatilityt-1 -0.007 -0.035*** 0.050*** 0.033***
[-0.83] [-2.71] [5.73] [3.29]
Analyst Coveraget 0.096*** 0.149*** 0.016* 0.088***
[11.89] [11.71] [1.96] [9.27]
Adj R-Sq. 0.525 0.637 0.638 0.653
N 100,378 100,378 100,378 100,378
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: Robustness 
 
  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)







Distractiont -0.053*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.040***
[-2.90] [-3.69] [-3.73] [-4.07] [-3.42] [-2.59]
Adj R-Sq. 0.653 0.652 0.675 0.655 0.661 0.697 0.673 0.655
N 100,378 97,112 63,119 74,937 80,728 144,900 127,581 77,658
Sample Full Full IO change No Extreme No Year >= Year >= Year >=
<.05 EPS Change Financials 1994 1998 2005
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Opportunism and Disclosure Sensitivity to IO Distraction 
This table presents OLS regressions estimating equation (1) after eliminating certain observations.  The sample consists of quarterly 
observations from 2001-2016.  Column 1 eliminates firms that experience a diversifying M&A transaction that quarter.  Column 2 
eliminates firms decreasing their dividend that quarter compared to the same quarter last year.  Column 3 (4) eliminates firms with an 
average abnormal profit from insider trades exceeding 1% (observations from the first and second fiscal quarter of the year).  Column 
5 eliminates firm-quarters in the bottom quintile of industry-adjusted returns over the next twelve months.  For brevity, we do not report 
coefficients for the control variables included in equation (1), although our tests include them.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and industry-quarter.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Disclosures Disclosures Disclosures Disclosures Disclosures
Distractiont -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.054*** -0.051***
[-3.76] [-4.06] [-3.79] [-2.60] [-3.00]
Sample No Div. No Dividend No IT No Fiscal No Low
M&A Decrease Profit Q1 or Q2 Future Ind-Adj
Returns
Adj R-Sq. 0.654 0.653 0.667 0.638 0.657
N 98,169 98,547 73,501 48,615 81,109
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Forecast Type Variables 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in our forecast type tests.  The sample 
consists of quarterly observations from 2001-2016 where a forecast was made.  To facilitate 
interpretation, we report statistics for the raw version of our variables, while our regressions use 
logarithmic transformations.  See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% N
EAD Forecasts 2.939 2.498 1.000 2.000 4.000 64,497   
Non-EAD Forecasts 0.921 1.784 0.000 0.000 1.000 64,497   
Earnings Forecast 0.720 0.449 0.000 1.000 1.000 64,497   
Revenue Forecast 0.476 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 64,497   
Other Income Forecast 0.225 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 64,497   
Other Forecast 0.457 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 64,497   
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Table 6: Forecast Types and IO Distraction 
This table presents OLS regressions studying forecast types as a function of IO attention.    The sample consists of 100,378 quarterly 
observations from 2001-2016.  For brevity, we do not report coefficients for the control variables included in equation (1), although our 
tests include them.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics based on standard errors 
that are clustered by firm and industry-quarter.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EAD Non-EAD Earnings Revenue Other Income Other 
Forecasts Forecasts Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
Distractiont -0.055*** 0.020 -0.001 -0.013 -0.041*** -0.038**
[-2.82] [0.92] [-0.06] [-1.05] [-3.28] [-2.37]
Adj R-Sq. 0.577 0.242 0.669 0.678 0.516 0.566
N 64,492 64,492 64,492 64,492 64,492 64,492
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for Information Quality and Liquidity Variables 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in our information quality and 
liquidity tests.  The sample consists of quarterly observations from 2001-2016.  To facilitate 
interpretation, we report statistics for the raw version of our variables, while our regressions use 
logarithmic transformations.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.   





Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% N
Horizon 1.839 2.026 0.575 1.164 2.416 64,062         
Precision 10.711 8.858 4.000 8.000 14.000 64,062         
Announcement Abnormal Volatility 13.014 19.881 2.806 6.488 14.402 90,039         
Announcement Abnormal Volume 5.564 4.590 2.579 4.330 7.027 90,039         
Announcement Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread 3.448 2.705 1.714 2.826 4.420 88,893         
Announcement Abnormal Depth 3.622 2.546 1.848 3.028 4.725 88,893         
Quarter Abnormal Volatility 1.823 2.874 0.473 0.969 1.983 100,365       
Quarter Abnormal Volume 1.090 0.469 0.826 0.999 1.224 100,376       
Quarter Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread 1.033 0.414 0.806 0.965 1.161 99,162         
Quarter Abnormal Depth 1.009 0.240 0.863 0.991 1.128 99,162         
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Table 8: Information Quality, Liquidity, and IO Distraction 
This table presents OLS regressions studying information quality and liquidity as a function of IO 
attention.  The sample consists of quarterly observations from 2001-2016.  For brevity, we do not 
report coefficients for the control variables included in equation (1), although our tests include 
them.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics 
based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and industry-quarter.  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Forecast Quality 
Columns 1 and 2 are conditioned on a forecast.   





Adj R-Sq. 0.531 0.549
N 64,062 64,062
Controls Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes
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Panel B: Information Quality 
Columns 1 and 2 are conditioned on a disclosure.  Columns 3 and 4 measure total information 
quality over the entire quarter, rather than the total around disclosure days. 
    
 
Panel C: Liquidity 
Columns 1 and 2 are conditioned on a disclosure.  Columns 3 and 4 measure total liquidity over 
the entire quarter, rather than the total around disclosure days. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announcement Announcement Quarter Quarter
Abnormal Abnormal Abnormal Abnormal
Volatility Volume Volatility Volume
Distractiont -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.013
[-0.08] [0.10] [-0.08] [-1.06]
Adj R-Sq. 0.244 0.334 0.101 0.184
N 90,038 90,038 100,365 100,376
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announcement Announcement Quarter Quarter
Abnormal Bid- Abnormal Abnormal Bid- Abnormal
Ask Spread Depth Ask Spread Depth
Distractiont 0.005 0.005 0.019** 0.012
[0.25] [0.24] [2.09] [1.48]
Adj R-Sq. 0.384 0.377 0.610 0.413
N 88,876 88,876 99,162 99,162
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: Passive vs. Non-Passive IO Distraction 
This table presents OLS regressions estimating equation (1) using Passive IO Distraction and Non-
Passive IO Distraction.  The sample consists of quarterly observations from 2001-2016.  Panel A 
models the incidence and frequency of various disclosures (analogous to Table 3).  Panel B 
presents OLS regressions studying information quality and liquidity at a quarterly level (analogous 
to Table 8). For brevity, we do not report coefficients for the control variables included in equation 
(1), although our tests include them. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and industry-quarter.  
The row “Difference in Coefficients” reports the difference between the coefficients on Passive 
IO Distraction and Non-Passive IO Distraction, and indicates if this difference is significant.  *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Disclosures 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Forecast Firm Forecasts 8-Ks Disclosures
Passive IO Distraction -0.010 -0.037** -0.025** -0.057***
[-1.22] [-2.40] [-2.57] [-4.59]
Non-Passive IO Distraction -0.004 -0.020** -0.005 -0.018**
[-0.70] [-2.22] [-0.78] [-2.38]
Difference in Coefficients:             
Passive-Non Passive IO Distraction -0.006 -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.039***
Adj R-Sq. 0.525 0.638 0.638 0.654
N 100,378 100,378 100,378 100,378
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Abnormal Abnormal Abnormal Bid- Abnormal
Horizon Precision Volatility Volume Ask Spread Depth
Passive IO Distraction -0.043*** -0.022 -0.001 -0.004 0.013* 0.017***
[-3.09] [-1.23] [-0.04] [-0.42] [1.85] [2.73]
Non-Passive IO Distraction -0.012 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 0.006 0.001
[-1.45] [-0.64] [-0.30] [-0.72] [1.45] [0.16]
Difference in Coefficients:             
Passive-Non Passive IO Distraction -0.031*** -0.016 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.016***
Adj R-Sq. 0.528 0.550 0.101 0.184 0.611 0.414
N 62,930 62,930 100,365 100,376 99,162 99,162
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Online Appendix to: 
 
 




















This online appendix tabulates additional analyses. 
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Table A1: Eliminate Observations after 2012 
This table presents OLS regressions estimating equation (1), except we eliminate observations 
after 2012.  For brevity, we do not report coefficients for the control variables included in Table 
3, Panel A, although our tests include them.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Reported 
below the coefficients are t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and 






Disclosures Volatility Ask Spread
Distractiont -0.067*** 0.032 0.029***
[-3.65] [0.88] [3.08]
Adj R-Sq. 0.651 0.113 0.656
N 78,314 78,303 77,732
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3066136 
61 
 
Table A2: Information Quality and Liquidity Robustness 
This table presents robustness analyses for our Table 8 results.  The sample consists of quarterly observations from 2001-2016.  For 
brevity, we do not report coefficients for the control variables included in equation (1), although our tests include them.  Columns 1 and 
2 examine distraction over three quarters (Distraction[-2,0]).  Columns 3 and 4 study firm-quarters where Disclosures changed from 
four quarters ago.  Columns 5 and 6 eliminate firm-quarters in the bottom quintile of industry-adjusted returns over the next twelve 
months.  We use an instrumental variables strategy in Columns 7 and 8.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm and quarter level.  *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 































Distractiont -0.007 0.008 -0.013 0.019**
[-0.14] [0.70] [-0.32] [2.05]
Disclosuret (IV) 0.042 -0.257*
[0.08] [-1.72]
Adj R-Sq. 0.102 0.611 0.102 0.624 0.103 0.614 0.101 0.518
N 97,110 96,074 65,397 64,740 81,102 80,141 100,365 99,162
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm x Calendar Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Quarter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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